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1. INTRODUCTION 
WTO accession by Vietnam on 11 January 2007 as the 150th member of this organization 
culminates a long process of efforts to integrate the Vietnamese economy into international 
markets. Since 1986, when the Doi Moi restructuring process began, Vietnam has negotiated a 
series of bilateral trade agreements. Numerous market-oriented legal and economic reforms have 
been introduced, and significant institutional changes have put the country on the path to become 
a more open, socialist-oriented market economy. This was established as an overarching goal at 
the Ninth Party Congress in April of 2001.  
Among the more than 100 other trade agreements of varying scope,1 Vietnam signed a 
bilateral agreement with the European Union (EU) in 1992. It joined ASEAN in 1995, and in 
2000 entered into a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the U.S. Each time such a major 
agreement was reached, Vietnam’s trade with that region expanded, and these trade agreements 
were clearly an impetus to ongoing domestic economic reforms. They included reducing the role 
of state owned enterprises (SOEs), revising commercial law, granting greater access of foreign 
firms to the domestic economy and establishing new regulations to facilitate international trade.  
Negotiations to join the WTO began in 1995 and eventually involved 20 separately 
negotiated bilateral agreements with WTO member countries. These agreements went beyond 
previously established trade agreements with those same countries and set the terms for 
Vietnam’s accession. The final accession agreement was negotiated in 2006 with a working party 
including 63 countries. Overall, Vietnam’s WTO membership has been predicated on the 
implementation of institutional reforms negotiated in earlier bilateral trade agreements, with 
special focus on completing legal reforms and pursuing institutional changes.  
The liberal reforms undertaken by Vietnam have been associated with rapid economic 
growth, increasing international trade and impressive poverty reduction. GDP per capita 
measured in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) corrected (2000) dollars increased almost 
threefold from $1,097 in 1989 to $2,739 in 2005 (World Bank, 2006). Figure 1 presents this 
exceptional growth performance and accompanying expansion of trade (imports plus exports), to 
140% of GDP in 2004, along with data on significant reduction in poverty. According to the 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006), headcount poverty (at the $1 per capita per 
day threshold) had already fallen to below 15% in 1993 and was only 2% in 2002. Vietnam’s 
own poverty criterion set the poverty rate at 58% in 1993 and slightly below 29% in 2002, with a 
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food poverty measure of 24% in 1993 and 11% in 2002 (Thang, 2004). From this economic 
performance Vietnam would seem to be a particularly illuminating case in which to study the 
linkages between international trade liberalization, economic development, and poverty 
reduction. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The policy dialogue by both foreigners and Vietnamese has often evaluated the ongoing 
reform process in much harsher terms than the impressive economic performance would seem to 
warrant.2 Critiques of Vietnamese policy continue to highlight such factors as the need for 
deeper institutional reform and persistently high tariffs for clothing and agricultural 
commodities. This is so even if Vietnamese tariffs are low by developing country standards. 
Tariffs averaged only 16% in 2000 (STAR-Vietnam, 2002), well before WTO accession and 
associated commitments were even remotely in sight. Numerous studies of the likely impacts of 
bilateral trade agreements and WTO accession have called for further reform to spur trade and 
development.3 Yet, those same studies fail to demonstrate the causal mechanisms underlying the 
successes of earlier trade agreements. Much of the critique is informed by the basic theory 
underlying trade models, but existing economy wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models have not been very helpful to policy makers. This is so both with regard to estimated 
aggregate levels of economic variables and in the details of how growth and trade evolve. 
Simulated changes are often small relative to both prior performance and to actual changes 
following past trade agreements. 
We believe there is a contradiction between Vietnam’s socioeconomic performance and 
the critiques of policy which have emanated from model based evaluations of the Vietnamese 
trade regime. The models have, as we see it, overemphasized tariff changes as the key element of 
reform and have failed to integrate satisfactorily the potential impact of institutional changes. It 
is not uncommon for authors of economy wide impact studies to acknowledge the ongoing 
debate in Vietnam over legal reforms, the role of SOEs, access by foreign firms, and the 
importance of “services trade” – banking, insurance, financial markets, wholesale and retail 
trade, and telecommunications. Subsequent formal modeling exercises have almost exclusively 
limited the analysis to tariff changes, however, probably because these other reforms are indeed 
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hard to capture. One study which did try to address these changes was only able to model the 
pro-competitive effects of service trade reforms, and concluded that impacts of the reforms 
negotiated in the Vietnam WTO accession agreement would be trivial in comparison to recent 
economic performance (Dee et al., 2005). Arguably, the performance following past bilateral 
trade agreements paints a very different picture of both the success of past reforms and the likely 
impact of WTO accession than modeling efforts have so far been able to unravel. 
In this paper we examine Vietnam’s past experience with economic integration as a basis 
for predicting the economic impact of WTO accession, and we ask whether WTO accession will 
further economic growth and poverty reduction. Our expectations, based on historical 
experience, are that impacts are likely to be much greater than existing formal modeling 
exercises indicate. Several lessons of relevance to developing countries more generally can be 
drawn from this analysis, and we suggest that a distinctly different analytical path to the 
evaluation of trade agreement impacts than has so far been pursued at both national and 
international level is long overdue. Whatever path is followed, it must better address institutional 
reforms and services trade issues. The same goes for the key roles played by unemployment and 
international capital flows as well as productivity growth in determining consequences of 
economic integration. The key questions which should be addressed up-front, instead of asking 
about tariff revisions, are: (i) What are the critical new institutional reforms WTO accession will 
bring about that go beyond the significant steps already taken under the various bilateral trade 
agreements?; and (ii) What are the likely impacts of these implementation steps in light of 
historical experience, and through what mechanisms do they work? We hypothesize that the 
mechanisms through which WTO accession will influence economic development are most 
likely to work through incentives to investment. 
In the next section of this paper further detail on Vietnam’s trade policy history is 
examined. We present a timeline of economic and legal reforms, pinpoint when major bilateral 
trade agreements were reached, and examine the trade performance following those changes. 
Then we review in Section 3 existing model based assessments of both WTO accession and 
bilateral trade agreement impacts, comparing predictions to actual outcomes. This is followed in 
Section 4 by an identification of the key features of those models which limit their ability to 
predict and indication of the directions future research on quantitative assessment of trade 
liberalization need to take. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC HISTORY – POLICY AND TRADE 
Figure 1 has already shown the remarkable economic performance of Vietnam following 
the Doi Moi (renovation) reforms in 1986. Since then GDP has grown steadily at an average of 
7.6% per year. Growth accelerated to 9.8% a year from the early 1990s until 1998, but then 
stalled at 7.0% per year following the Asian financial crisis, before increasing again to 7.7% per 
year from 2002 to 2004. This rapid economic growth has been accompanied by an extraordinary 
increase in trade (imports plus exports) over this same period, from 23% in 1986 to 97% already 
in 1998 and 140% in 2004. Growth in exports has been especially impressive, from only 6.6% of 
GDP in 1986 to 44.8% in 1998 and 66.4% in 2004. Moreover, the share of exports in GDP has 
been rising somewhat faster than imports. In 1983 trade was more than two-thirds imports, 
whereas in 2004 exports are nearly half of the trade share of GDP. Imports continue to exceed 
exports as capital flows into Vietnam, but foreign direct investment (FDI) has been erratic and 
strongly affected by the Asian financial crisis. There was no measurable FDI in 1986; FDI grew 
to 7.7% of GDP by 1993, stagnated at below that level, equaling only 6.1% in 1998 and falling 
thereafter to less than 4% of GDP since 2002. Figure 1 shows that this erratic FDI inflow has had 
no discernable effect on past GDP growth, however, while the extent to which increasing GDP 
has been associated with reduced poverty by any measure is also clear.  
Performance has been less impressive for employment expansion. According to 
Yoko,Winters and Dutta (2003) employment has only increased from 2 to 3% since 1990. 
Unemployment remains at about 6.9% in urban areas and underemployment persists in rural 
areas. Nevertheless, real wages have increased 36-38% over this same period, with minimum 
wage increases and higher wages paid by foreign enterprises accounting for wage growth.  
Questions these data raise are whether the trade performance has followed or led 
economic growth, and whether trade policy and specifically trade agreements have played a 
significant role in explaining Vietnam’s development success. While this short time series, 
serious identification difficulties, and likely measurement errors in some of this data preclude 
direct econometric testing of the direction of these effects, we believe much can be learned from 
looking at the timing of reforms and corresponding bilateral trade flows. Trade performance, and 
particularly export success, has been region (destination) specific, and has followed successful 
negotiations of bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
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Figure 2 presents a timeline of significant changes in Vietnam’s trade and related 
domestic policies associated with increased international integration. The process of reforming 
Vietnam’s trading institutions and engaging in agreements with potential trade partners has been 
continuous if not smooth, so it is difficult to set precise dates with reforms that would 
significantly influence trade trends. 4 Specific dates for changes in bilateral export flows are more 
evident. Two types of events are highlighted in the timeline – key bilateral trade agreements and 
ongoing trade related legal reforms.  
  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Legal reforms have been instituted as part of the ongoing renovation process, in response 
to negotiations both of bilateral agreements and as part of the WTO accession process. The first 
significant changes at the border involved introduction of import tariffs in 1988, elimination of 
the state monopoly over international trade in 1989, and establishment of export processing 
zones in 1990. While additional reforms were undertaken in the 1990s, a substantial new impetus 
to legal reform began following the U.S. bilateral trade agreement (BTA) signed in 2000. Since 
then Vietnam has rewritten its commercial code almost entirely, with significant new Enterprise, 
Competition, and Investment Laws all introduced. The final negotiations for Vietnam’s WTO 
accession were enabled by significant additional legal reforms undertaken particularly in 2005 as 
the U.S. and other WTO members insisted that Vietnam implement reforms before accession 
would be granted. These legal reforms have gone a long way to establish property rights and 
contract sanctity and to create a court system where business related legal issues can be 
addressed. This has made it easier for foreign firms to do business in Vietnam, and as an external 
benefit it is now also easier for Vietnamese firms to do business. WTO accession will insure 
multilateral application of the reforms negotiated with each region individually. 
The timeline in Figure 2 also shows some of the key bilateral agreements negotiated by 
Vietnam. Yoko,Winters and Dutta (2003)  notes that by 2000 Vietnam had negotiated 129 either 
bilateral trade agreements (57) or MFN tariff agreements (72). The first major agreement was 
with the EU in 1992. Vietnam also joined ASEAN in 1995, the same year that WTO accession 
talks formally began. Vietnam then joined APEC in 1998 and implementation of tariff reductions 
under CEPT/AFTA began in 2001. Agreements under ASEAN auspices with China and Japan 
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followed in 2002 and 2003, and implementation of the BTA with the U.S. got underway in 2002. 
Bilateral agreements on WTO accession were reached with WTO members, including countries 
with which Vietnam had previously negotiated bilateral trade agreements. For example, Vietnam 
concluded its accession agreement with the EU in 2004 and all accession agreements were 
completed in 2006, including a new agreement with the U.S. specifically to allow Vietnam to 
join the WTO. 
It has been argued in the literature that many of the earlier bilateral agreements probably 
had little impact on Vietnam’s trade and economic performance, since they were with similar 
countries, suggesting little basis for Vietnam to realize comparative advantage. Moreover, tariff 
reductions were typically small and occurring over long, delayed implementation periods 
(Fukase and Martin, 1999b). Yet, each agreement also altered institutional arrangements between 
Vietnam and its potential trading partners, and data on bilateral trade flows paints a different 
picture of the effectiveness of these early trade agreements. Figure 3 shows exports since 1986 
from Vietnam to ASEAN countries (as of 1995), with the year Vietnam joined ASEAN (i.e. 
1995) noted by a horizontal line. Figure 4 then shows exports from Vietnam to the EU, the U.S., 
China, Japan and South Korea, with the years of the EU and U.S. bilateral agreements 
highlighted. In each case trade takes off with a region once bilateral trade agreements have been 
reached. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
 Figure 3 illustrates that well before tariff reductions occurred in 2001 under 
CEPT/AFTA, trade with ASEAN partners increased significantly. Trade with Vietnam’s most 
important ASEAN partner, Singapore actually began increasing in 1994, just prior to Vietnam’s 
entry into ASEAN. Trade with other ASEAN partners started to grow in the mid to late nineties, 
with obvious limits due to the Asian financial crisis, and with resurgence to Singapore and 
several other ASEAN partners after 2000. Since 1999, exports to Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines, now Vietnam’s most important ASEAN export destinations, increased at least four- 
fold, well beyond any model predictions of exports to these countries. Exports to Singapore 
reached $1.8 billion in 2004, with exports to Thailand and the Philippines nearing $1 billion and 
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to Malaysia reaching $600 million. It should be noted that exports to these destinations did not 
fall as exports surged to the U.S. following the BTA.  
  Figure 4 shows that trade between the EU and Vietnam increased rapidly from a very low 
level immediately following the 1992 bilateral agreement. Exports grew rapidly again from $4.5 
billion in 2002 to $7 billion in 2004, at the same time the U.S. BTA went into effect, and when 
the EU completed its WTO accession negotiations with Vietnam. Vietnam exported essentially 
nothing to the U.S. until the mid 1990s and just prior to implementation of the BTA in 2002 had 
exported at most $1 billion per year. Those exports increased to over $6.5 billion in 2005, 
making the U.S. Vietnam’s second most important export destination. Exports to Japan started 
earlier than to most of these other destinations, and yet showed another significant increase 
following the ASEAN-Japan agreement in 2002, going from about $2.5 billion and then to $4 
billion in 2004. Trade with China did not grow to significant levels until 2000, reaching $1 
billion, and then more than doubled to $2.5 billion in 2004. Again it is noteworthy that during 
periods where there were significant bilateral negotiations and institutional reforms, particularly 
after 2001, rapid increases in exports occurred to nearly all destinations.  
 A common result seen in these data is that as new agreements are reached, trade to that 
destination increases, often dramatically. These increases apparently do not come at the expense 
of exports to other destinations. There is little evidence that export surges to one region diminish 
exports elsewhere. Region specific exports are never seen to fall, except for a few instances 
explained by economic problems of partners in 1998 as a result of the Asian financial crisis. It is 
also generally the case that trade was initially at very low levels, and increased by orders of 
magnitude, posing problems for our standard analytical methods.  
Table 1 shows the mix of goods Vietnam has been exporting and importing as of 2003. 
About a fifth of Vietnam’s exports are of food and live animals, with fish, crustaceans, and 
mollusks accounting for over half of the exports in this category, and cereals, vegetables, fruits, 
and coffee also contributing significant exports. Petroleum accounts for an additional 20% and 
labor intensive manufactured goods represent about a third of Vietnam’s exports. Almost half of 
those manufactured goods exports are clothing while furniture and footwear are also a large 
fraction. Vietnam’s imports have complemented those exports, including mostly either 
intermediate inputs (fertilizer, plastics, leather, textiles, iron and steel) or capital goods 
(machinery and transport equipment). Some have raised concerns as to the highly specialized 
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nature of Vietnam’s exports and its dependence on only a few labor intensive sectors for its 
growth (Roland-Holst et al., 2002). Concerns have also been voiced that some labor intensive 
industries (e.g. electronics) have not grown as fast as clothing. Consumer goods have been only a 
small part of Vietnamese imports. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 In light of the highly specialized nature of Vietnam’s exports, and given concerns to be 
raised later on modeling predictions of Vietnam’s trade, we look in Table 2 at Vietnam’s 
bilateral trade by commodity at a level of disaggregation corresponding to three digit SITC 
commodities. For each of the key regions with whom bilateral trade agreements have been 
reached we report the extent of specialization and the number of three digit commodities traded 
in years before and after trade agreements were reached as well as in the most recent year for 
which detailed data was available, 2004. In the case of exports to the EU, in 1990 prior to the 
bilateral agreement the top five commodities accounted for 60.8% of exports and the top 20 for 
89%. After the agreement in 1996, similar specialization remained in spite of an increase in trade 
levels by a factor of 24, from $74 million to $1.8 billion. But the number of three digit 
commodities exported doubled from 93 to 185. Exports to the EU quadrupled again to $6.9 
billion in 2004, and the top 20 commodities still accounted for 88% of exports, while the number 
of three digit commodities exported increased to 203. In the case of exports to the US, prior to 
the BTA the top 20 commodities accounted for 98.5% of $342 million in exports in 1996 and 
97.2% of $885 million in exports in 2000. But in 2004, the number of commodities exported had 
increased from 108 to 138, and exports had increased 7.5 times, to $6.6 billion. The U.S. has 
remained a relatively specialized destination, as the top 20 commodities accounted for 94.4% of 
imports in 2004. Singapore and China present similar stories. While substantial growth in 
exports following trade agreements (ASEAN entry) are found, the top five commodities account 
for around 80% of exports and the top 20 for over 90%. The number of three digit commodities 
exported increased, substantially so in China’s case, reaching 171 to China and 182 to Singapore, 
more than to the U.S. but less than to the EU.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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 The data describing Vietnam’s economic and trade experience following the opening of 
its markets and more specifically following its major trade agreements tells a compelling story 
about the correlation between institutional reforms, trade performance and economic growth. 
Typically, most critical tariff reductions are delayed in these agreements, and yet trade has taken 
off with a region, sometimes even before those reductions go in force. 
 The lessons which seem to emerge are that bilateral trade agreements in the past have 
generated new trade flows well beyond the levels likely to follow from modest tariff reductions. 
So based on history, it is reasonable to expect that WTO accession will continue to reinforce 
Vietnam’s trade based growth trajectory. Trade patterns that emerged in the past have been 
somewhat specialized, but emergence of new traded products has been a key feature of 
successful agreements. In addition, it was difficult to see competition for resources resulting in 
gains from trade from an agreement reached with a specific partner coming at the expense of 
trade with other partners. Often as major new bilateral agreements were arrived at, trade flows to 
other destinations expanded as well. Model results compared to these actual outcomes will 
highlight the importance of widely applied institutional reforms and bring us to raise questions as 
to which constraints actually limited Vietnam’s trade and economic expansion.  
 WTO accession in early 2007 is the next step in this process of legal and economic 
reform. Multilateral negotiations began in 1995 with establishment of a working party composed 
of 63 WTO member countries. Separate bilateral agreements concerning Vietnam’s WTO 
accession have been reached with a total of 20 countries, including the U.S., EU China, Japan, 
India, Korea and Australia. WTO accession will insure multilateral application of the reforms 
negotiated with each region individually – both tariff reductions and institutional reforms. 
Vietnamese officials and observers of these negotiations have argued that concessions required 
of Vietnam have gone well beyond existing member practices and requirements in other recent 
accession agreements (e.g. China’s accession to the WTO), dubbing these requirements as 
“WTO-Plus”. In particular, agricultural reforms have gone beyond the requirements of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, and the scope of bilateral negotiations has gone well 
beyond tariff reductions and includes concessions on public subsidies, further legal reform, 
services trade, state trading enterprises, and Vietnam’s status as a non-market economy.5 In 
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predicting effects of this agreement, account must be taken of these substantial institutional 
reforms which continue the process ongoing since 1986.  
In debate in Vietnam on potential impacts, discussion quickly moves from tariff 
commitments to finance and insurance, telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade, and 
energy, where foreign firm operation in Vietnam rather than cross border trade is the focus of the 
debate. We believe the critical questions that need answers to assess the likely impacts of WTO 
accession are whether the continuing legal reforms take Vietnam significantly beyond changes 
already made, and what effects on investment and productivity greater presence of foreign firms 
may bring. Vietnam’s tariffs were low when negotiations began, and only small further 
reductions have been taken, though there may be some key sectors where foreign interests have 
gained increased market access. We contrast below the most important changes which are 
emerging from these negotiations and the changes which are the focus of modeling efforts as 
background for a discussion of the consequences of increased international economic integration.  
 
3. MODELING VIETNAM’S TRADE AGREEMENTS 
A number of modeling exercises have attempted to quantify the impacts of both bilateral 
trade agreements and Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Rama and Sa (2005) have carefully 
reviewed 26 such studies, including a study establishing an underlying database for modeling. 
We subsequently found another four studies which have addressed the likely economic impacts 
of trade liberalization in Vietnam. Several of the studies examined by Rama and Sa were partial 
equilibrium evaluations of likely WTO impacts on key sectors – rice, sugar, maize, livestock, 
textiles, and clothing. Sixteen of the 29 impact studies, however, utilized computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models and provided quantitative predictions of the economy-wide impacts 
of trade policy reform. 
 Specifications of the CGE models used to investigate trade liberalization by Vietnam 
mostly follow either the GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997) or the World Bank’s Linkage 
model (van der Mensbrugghe, 2005). Such models capture economy-wide relationships among 
the different sectors, factor markets, households and government, allocating scarce capital and 
labor to the most productive uses as dictated by incentives influenced by tariffs. Most assume 
perfectly competitive, efficient markets. None of these studies allowed for scale economies. 
Sectoral aggregation varied somewhat, with few studies utilizing the detail of the existing 100 
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plus sector IO table, and most limiting analysis to under 20 aggregate sectors. Minor 
modifications to those very similar specifications have not incorporated the recent additions to 
the Linkage model to allow dynamic simulations, focusing rather on static long run outcomes. 
The length of that long run period is not specified, an issue in evaluating results against actual 
performance, but we assume that a ten year time horizon is relevant, and the projected impacts 
are a one time change in any case, not an increase in growth rates. 
Base data for those models typically come from the official 1996 Vietnam IO table, with 
a SAM either updated using 1997 macroeconomic information as in the GTAP based models 
(Hertel, 1997), or in a few cases using more current SAMs  (see Tarp et al. 2001, 2002 and 
Jensen et al., 2004). All are based on the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys, done in 1992/93 or 
1997/98. Thus, base data differ little from one model to another. 
Following academic tradition, each study tends to focus on one aspect of the model, with 
most emphasis placed on characterizing model related policy reforms. Differences in 
assumptions on likely tariff reductions account for much of the differences found in results. 
Issues beyond tariff reduction were also addressed. For example, Ianchovichina (2003) modifies 
tariff data to account for duty drawbacks on re-exported intermediate imports. Huong and 
Vanzetti (2006) consider simulations which permit unemployment. Roland-Holst et al. (2002) 
examine complementary domestic reform which they posit brings substantial productivity gains. 
Dee et al. (2005) explicitly includes pro-competitive effects of service sector reform, and is the 
one study allowing for imperfect competition. Several studies address poverty reduction by 
disaggregating households. And several studies examine replacement taxation strategies to cope 
with lost tariff revenue, which has accounted for over one-third of Vietnam’s government 
revenue recently. But each study characterizes their results as a quantitative prediction of the 
likely impact of either WTO accession or earlier bilateral trade agreement adoption. 
 The general contention of the CGE studies is that Vietnam’s trade regime misallocates 
resources. Tariff reductions will free resources now going to protected industries, and so 
generate greater gains from trade and expansion of export industries, so increasing GDP. But 
these effects are typically small, especially on aggregate economic activity. Table 3 summarizes 
results for 30 scenarios from seven studies which recently explicitly examined WTO accession 
by Vietnam. Maximum GDP increases, due to the gains from trade, were less than 3.3% until 
two studies after 2005 got somewhat larger impacts. Huong and Vanzetti (2006) realize a 15 
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percent increase in GDP when labor constraints are relaxed to account for unemployment, but 
their prediction is in the range of other studies when employment is constrained. Dimaranan et 
al. (2005) realize in one scenario a 7.88% increase in total output, about one year’s growth, but 
in a scenario which did not take duty drawbacks into account. Taking those into account reduces 
their predicted impact by 70%. Nguyen and Ezaki (2005) argue that they expect liberalization to 
increase household consumption and reduce poverty, but their trade WTO accession/ multi-
lateral liberalization scenarios actually show declines in GDP.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
   
 Rama and Sa (2006) observe that these models may be manipulated to obtain desired 
results, as most changes are the result of exogenous assumptions of the authors, who have great 
freedom in setting scenarios. In our review we found GDP impacts tended to grow in later 
studies, supporting this concern. But these are quite small impacts on long run GDP, relative to 
the observed average 7.5% per annum growth rate that would have increased GDP 106% over 
ten years. This suggests that serious constraints in this framework limit its ability to capture the 
rapid growth of the Vietnamese economy, over which study authors have little control.  
 Trade impacts from the predictions of these models in Table 3 are somewhat larger than 
are GDP impacts, with studies typically showing 10 to 20 percent increases in exports over the 
long run. Actual exports increased more than 100% from 1993 to 2002, and grew even faster 
afterwards. Once again, the one instance in which large trade growth is predicted is for the 
unemployment scenario of Huong and Vanzetti (2006). Also, later studies found somewhat 
larger trade impacts within the above range. 
 The other key findings of these studies concerned poverty impacts, and the consequences 
of changes in taxation regimes to make up for lost tariff revenue. Not surprisingly, low GDP 
impacts make poverty predictions from trade liberalization inconclusive. Even the direction of 
the effect of trade liberalization on poverty varied among these studies, as did the GDP impact 
direction. Especially in cases where trade liberalization could lead to a decline in GDP, the 
effects of consumption goods for the poor (e.g. food) becoming more expensive are more likely 
to dominate. Authors’ predictions on poverty were conditional on their fiscal policy adjustments, 
which had at least as large an impact on GDP as did tariff reductions. Thus, losses from tax 
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changes could overwhelm the gains from trade, leading to the scenarios where GDP fell. These 
results are consistent with the findings on poverty impacts of trade liberalization of Hertel and 
Winters (2005), where proper modeling of microeconomic distortions is the key to getting 
appropriate impacts on poverty, and the effects of those distortions dominate tariff effects. 
 Comparisons of results from studies projecting impacts of bilateral agreements to actual 
outcomes are more direct because those agreements have been in force for several years, so 
relevant time periods exist over which observed trade and modeling results can be compared. 
Two studies done at the World Bank looked at impacts of Vietnam’s relationship with ASEAN 
(Fukase and Martin, 1999b) and at the U.S. Bilateral trade agreement (Fukase and Martin, 
1999a). In the case of the U.S. BTA, sectoral impacts for the successful sectors are also 
examined. Those studies were also done much earlier, and so anticipated lower impacts in line 
with typical outcomes from this type of study. 
In Table 4 we compare predicted changes from the study examining trade with ASEAN 
partners after 1996, when Vietnam joined ASEAN.6 Fukase and Martin (1999b), the authors of 
that study, had anticipated little impact because tariff changes under CEPT/AFTA would be 
small and delayed over a long implementation period, and there was little scope for comparative 
advantage among the similar countries of the region. Their long run predictions in Table 4 seem 
larger than this analysis suggests, but those changes were from a very low base level of trade. In 
the eight years from 1996 to 2004, their prediction underestimated actual increases in exports 
from Vietnam to Indonesia by a factor of four, and to Malaysia and Thailand by a factor of six. 
In the one case where they expected a large increase, the Philippines, actual exports fell from 
1996 to 2000 and then increased to nearly the predicted level by 2004. In the case of Singapore, 
Vietnam’s largest ASEAN partner, their export prediction was a 0.4% increase, yet actual 
exports increased over 200%. As we saw earlier in Figure 3, exports to ASEAN partners 
accelerated after Vietnam’s entry into that association. While the model failed to capture 
observed export increases, we would argue that this failure was foreordained by the structure of 
that model, which prevents trade flows increasing much from small initial levels. 
 
 [Table 4 about here] 
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The Fukase and Martin (1999a) rhetoric was somewhat more optimistic in the case of the 
U.S. BTA. Their predictions included some quite large percentage changes in exports for 
products in which exports were likely to increase due to very substantial tariff reductions by the 
U.S. once Vietnam faced MFN tariffs. Table 5 shows actual 1996 sectoral exports from Vietnam 
to the U.S., Fukase and Martin’s predicted increases (in % changes) and actual changes from 
1996 to 2004. Their most notable prediction was an increase in clothing exports of 1,512%, but 
actual exports increased over eight years by a much larger10,635%. They predicted that textile 
exports would increase by 218%, but the actual increase was 40,804%. Once again, the limitation 
in this modeling framework of low initial trade levels is evident, as it is very difficult even when 
tariff reductions are quite large, for substantially increased trade flows to emerge. Results are 
quite similar for the other sectors presented in Table 5. That table shows comparable results for 
overall trade, where one would not have expected the initial condition constraint to bind so 
tightly. In that case, the prediction was that exports would increase 127.4%, but over eight years 
they grew 1,576%.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 have taken three different approaches to comparing CGE model results 
of trade agreement impacts against Vietnam’s actual experience. In each case the models 
seriously underestimated the success of the trade agreement, as reflected both in continuing rapid 
economic growth, increased trade, and more importantly, increased exports to the partner with 
whom a new agreement has been reached. These results reflect the failure of these models to 
capture the trends and characteristics of trade following agreements as seen in the actual trade 
data discussed earlier. When one looks carefully at the limitations of these models, it is not 
surprising that this underestimation of trade impacts occurs; and we would argue that it is not 
unreasonable to expect the impact of WTO accession to follow more closely actual past 
experience following trade agreements rather than the model predictions. 
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4. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
 Several limitations of the CGE methodology typically employed to predict outcomes 
from Vietnam’s past and future trade agreements are well known. For example, most models 
predict (only) static and long run one time reallocations of resources as a consequence of price 
adjustments following tariff changes (Rodrik and Rodriguez, 1999). Hence, the effects of trade 
agreements do not influence the path of development. While dynamic specifications are at the 
frontier of CGE modeling (e.g. van der Mensbrugghe, 2005), none of the studies reviewed in the 
background survey underlying the present paper were dynamic. That literature is still wrestling 
with short run macroeconomic closure issues and inability to predict the evolution of capital 
stock over time. Moreover, the underlying assumption that capital will reallocate to the sectors 
yielding highest returns, the presumption of long run static models, has not served well in 
predicting short to medium run investment allocations (Ianchovichina et al., 2000). In our view, 
models will need to do a better job of explaining short to medium run sectoral capacity evolution 
before they can be expected to adequately address development implications of trade 
liberalization. 
 In dynamic CGE models as well as in static models, macroeconomic performance 
including economic growth is assumed (not endogenously predicted) based on an external 
forecast. So the only mechanism by which trade can affect GDP is via gains from trade generated 
by resource reallocations. It is also well understood that the Harberger triangles of net surplus 
gains from tariff changes can be quite small. This is why results from CGE models of WTO trade 
liberalization impacts have generally been found to be small relative to the size of economies 
examined (Ackerman, 2005). 
In the mid 1990s, the notion emerged that “dynamic gains” from trade liberalization were 
necessary to identify large impacts. The two key concepts put forward then were the pro-
competitive effects of trade liberalization and productivity gains resulting from greater openness 
(USITC, 1997). These changes are “dynamic” only in the sense that they go beyond tariff 
barriers, and have not fully included a growth model or explained the processes that give rise to 
productivity changes over time (Piermartimi and Teh, 2005). 
Only the Dee et al. (2005) study on Vietnam’s services trade examined potential pro-
competitive effects in the Vietnamese context as trade in general or opening service sectors to 
foreign firms prevent domestic firms from exploiting market power. It is unlikely, however, that 
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significant reductions in monopoly rents will occur as Vietnam moves from a state controlled 
economy to an open, market oriented economy. This is especially so since it has been common 
elsewhere for state enterprises to be replaced by oligopolistic multinational firms. Efficiency 
gains as state enterprises are replaced by private firms may be more likely to occur.  
Roland-Holst et al. (2002) included productivity gains, which they attributed to 
complementary domestic policy reform, and which were essentially exogenously imposed in 
their model. Nevertheless, the econometric literature on the relationship between trade 
liberalization and growth remains controversial and inconclusive. The presumption that a 
systematic relationship between the level of trade and productivity in a sector, commonly used in 
CGE models to capture dynamic gains, has yet to be conclusively supported econometrically. 
The broader literature shows that development and growth are due as much due to technological 
progress or productivity gains resulting from other efficiency enhancing factors as to capital 
accumulation (Andersen and Dalgaard, 2006). A more solid basis for understanding the 
relationship between sectoral productivity, capital accumulation and trade policy is needed to 
capture the effects of institutional changes.  
 The key mechanism in existing trade models driving changes after reform is tariff 
reductions and subsequent price changes, but even setting tariff change assumptions for an 
aggregate model is problematic. One problem is that tariff equivalents of NTBs must be 
established. Thus, modeling exercises show an increase in Vietnamese tariffs, as a result of 
tariffication of NTBs, following several reforms in the late 1990s, when trade levels were 
increasing. A second problem is aggregation. Negotiations involve compromises at a highly 
disaggregated level, and critical products and corresponding tariff lines in negotiations can be for 
very narrowly defined sectors. In evaluating the potential outcome from the Doha Round, the 
World Bank (Anderson and Martin, 2005) noted that exempting just 5% of tariff lines from 
reduction could eliminate potential gains from Doha Round trade liberalization. None of the 
Vietnam studies we have reviewed are sufficiently disaggregated to overcome problems of 
missing critical detailed information relevant to negotiations. Rather, simplistic tariff changes, 
such as projecting free trade outcomes, are assumed since details of the outcome of WTO 
accession negotiations were not yet available at the time of writing. So, likely tariff changes are 
overestimated while the projected trade and economic outcomes are underestimated. This again 
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reinforces the notion that tariff changes, especially as equivalents of NTBs, are far from all that 
matters.  
 Some of the specific modeling choices in typical trade models have also been subject to 
considerable criticism (Ackerman, 2005; Taylor and von Arnim, 2006), and this includes the 
functional form determining how tariff reductions are translated into market access 
improvements. One of the most important features of these models is the Armington 
specification of international market share determination. In this approach, imported 
intermediates (by source) are assumed to be separable from domestically produced intermediate 
inputs. That is, firms first decide on the sourcing of their imports. Then, based on the resulting 
composite import price, they determine the optimal mix of imported and domestic goods (Hertel, 
1997). The specific functional forms used (i.e. the constant elasticity of substitution or CES 
types) have the virtue of allowing observed two way trade, and they constrain base solutions and 
simulations of small shocks to stay near the base case outcomes, so model results appear 
realistic. Yet, they must essentially be seen as an ad hoc feature to cope with aggregation 
problems that exaggerate market power in trade and more importantly, they limit the potential 
for new markets to emerge.  
Historically, the values of the Armington substitution elasticities were simply assumed, 
yet these parameters are critically important in determining the magnitude and nature of changes 
that occur in CGE models. We know of no studies estimating these parameters for Vietnam. 
Furthermore, if initial international market shares are zero, the Armington functions must keep 
shares at zero, and where shares are low initially, very large price differentials and/or substitution 
elasticities are needed to allow those sectors to grow to any appreciable size. In contrast, trade 
data for Vietnam following each of its major trade agreements show, at least when viewed at a 
reasonable degree of disaggregation, that small sectors become large and new products emerge. 
Table 2 demonstrated that for trade with the EU, China and Singapore, the number of three digit 
SITC commodities exported to those destinations from Vietnam doubled from about 100 to 
about 200 commodities. In the case of the BTA with the U.S., the number of commodities 
increased from 88 to 138, but the value of trade increased more than six-fold.  
 The Armington/CES functional form prevents observed increases in the number of 
commodities traded and in the magnitude of trade flows unless unrealistically large parameter 
values are chosen. Use of those large parameters would only be sensible for a brief period after 
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the beginning of a trade agreement. To show this, we imputed the Armington elasticities of 
substitution necessary to capture the observed increases in Vietnam’s share of the U.S. market 
following the BTA for seven of the more successful commodities (Table 6). This is a 
straightforward case to model – if tariffs are all that drive trade. In most cases Vietnamese 
exports can be considered small relative to the U.S. market. We assume that U.S. import prices 
for other exporters and on average remain fixed, so tariff changes closely approximate relative 
price changes faced by Vietnamese exporters. We then imputed the Armington elasticities 
reported in Table 6 using the following formulae: 
Eclothing, Vietnam-US = Mclothing, US (ShareVietnam)o((PUS +Tmfn)/(PUS + To, Vietnam))
ε 
 
(ShareVietnam)o  = (Eclothing, Vietnam-US / Mclothing, US )o 
 
where Eclothing, Vietnam-US is exports of clothing (or some other good) from Vietnam to the U.S., 
Mclothing, US is total clothing imports from all exporters by the U.S., PUS is the world price of 
clothing at the U.S. border, Tmfn is the ad valorem MFN tariff applied by the U.S. to most 
imports, To, Vietnam is the higher tariff paid by Vietnam prior to the BTA, o denotes the year before 
the BTA went into effect, and ε is the Armington elasticity of substitution to be imputed. 
 For some sectors – cashews, fish, crustaceans, and coffee – tariffs were initially very 
small, and Armington elasticities need to be over 100 for the assumed model structure to capture 
the successful increases in these sectors. For other sectors – apparel, clothing, electronics 
footwear, and furniture – tariff reductions were quite substantial yet substitution elasticities 
greater than eight and as high as 20 were needed to capture the big increases in Vietnam’s share 
of the U.S. market.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 The results from Fukase and Martin (1999a) on the U.S. BTA highlight this problem. The 
small initial share of Vietnam in the U.S. clothing market dooms that model to under predict the 
effects of that agreement, even in the sectors where tariff changes were large. While their 
prediction of changes in clothing exports seemed large at 1,512%, the actual change was 
10,635%, both from a very small base (Table 5). The results for electronics were comparable, 
even though that sector has not (yet) been as successful as clothing.  
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 The extremely large elasticities, and very large new exports in sectors where tariffs were 
almost zero before an agreement suggest that other, institutional factors, not tariff changes, are 
what drive export success after a trade agreement. Even in cases where tariff changes are 
significant, the Armington elasticities must be quite large to explain observed trade changes. 
This highlights that movements along a restrictive demand function cannot explain the 
improvements in market access that these trade agreements bring. Accordingly, whatever 
approach is used to predict the consequences of trade agreement, it should not rely on the 
Armington specification, and must take into account both openings in market access (demand 
pull or constraints on exports) and institutional changes which affect market access, productivity 
and incentives to invest in the exporting country.   
 Labor market assumptions have also been a focus of criticism of the CGE models 
(Polanski, 2006; Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). In the studies reviewed, only Huong and Vanzetti 
(2006) model closures permitting unemployment, but they identified only one such case, which 
they characterized as extreme. However, Vietnam’s experience with past agreements and 
economic growth more generally has shown only modest employment gains (Yoko,Winters and 
Dutta, 2003), so the unemployment closure of Huong and Vanzetti (2006) may not be as extreme 
as they suggest. While still quite low relative to history, this closure finds the most reasonable 
trade and GDP impacts. It may also be the case that education levels constrain employment 
growth from some activities but not for others, suggesting that a more detailed look at labor 
markets is required than found in these models. At a minimum, relationships between urban and 
rural labor markets and the constraints they imply for particular sectors need to be better 
understood.  
 A fundamental concern in assessing alternative future model specifications is to ask what 
constrains sectoral growth. In most CGE models, and all those examined as part of this paper, 
gains for one country typically come at the expense of losses for other countries as fixed capital 
and labor endowments are reallocated across sectors. In the Vietnamese case, however, it is hard 
to argue that labor has to this point been a serious constraint on growth. The effect of FDI in 
augmenting capital is not apparent in determining growth either (Figure 1), and the literature has 
had difficulty in attributing productivity gains to the presence of FDI. Yet, it must be the case 
that capacity constrains growth, subject to productivity enhancing effects of institutional reforms 
and to demand constraints that may be relaxed as new market access opportunities arise.   
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 Institutional changes, improved market access, and domestic reform all change the 
incentives to invest in particular sectors following trade agreements. Those investments together 
with the institutional changes both increase capacity and enhance productivity. A successful 
trade model would need to predict both any changes in investment patterns and productivity 
increases sector by sector as a consequence of all aspects of trade agreements. It is likely that 
high fixed (initial) costs of those investments mean that trade liberalization may facilitate the 
exploitation of significant scale economies. Sectoral estimates of likely capacity expansions 
provide better information than aggregated CGE models now do. Current models can 
accommodate the national accounting constraints within which such capital allocations occur, 
but they can capture endogenously neither the allocation of investment nor the increase in 
productivity that have apparently followed past trade agreements.  
 The earlier comparison of actual outcomes versus model predictions demonstrated that 
future trade liberalization is likely to have larger effects than CGE models predict; and the above 
model limitations help to explain why underestimation is common and inevitable. A better 
understanding of the mechanisms by which trade liberalization, and trade agreements in all their 
aspects, influences economic outcomes therefore needs to be developed. Those mechanisms 
must be incorporated into models intended to predict trade outcomes for them to be relevant to 
policy makers.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Vietnam has since 1986 experienced rapid economic growth and important reductions in 
poverty incidence. This economic performance has been accompanied by continuous, if not 
smooth, institutional reforms, which have substantially increased the extent of integration of 
Vietnam’s economy into world markets. Each time Vietnam has negotiated a major trade 
agreement with an important partner, the extent of trade with that partner has expanded, and it 
would appear to never have been at the expense of trade with other regions. Agreements with the 
EU, ASEAN and the U.S. had already before WTO accession in early 2007 reduced tariffs to a 
relatively low average level. More significantly, they had helped encourage the economic, legal 
and administrative reforms that have formed an integral part of the Vietnamese Doi Moi market 
oriented restructuring process.  
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 Existing studies have based predictions of the impact of WTO accession by Vietnam on 
analytical modeling frameworks, which are similar to those that have failed to predict the past 
success of bilateral trade agreements. There is no shortage of alternative economy wide studies 
utilizing CGE models to examine trade policy impacts in Vietnam. We considered 16 such 
studies in this research, with background documentation and further review available in Abbott 
et al. (2006). These models find small endogenously generated changes in trade and GDP, and 
they must resort to exogenous productivity shocks to get results that seem qualitatively more in 
line with historical experience. Moreover, it is far from apparent that the theoretical resource 
constraints applied in existing models reflect Vietnamese reality. Actual experience shows that 
trade flows to partners not participating in an agreement in a particular period expand, and that 
trade flow expansion in one sector does not appear to carry with it declines in other sectors. In 
contrast, models are typically built so that expansion of one sector (e.g. textiles and clothing) and 
to one partner (e.g. the U.S.) come at the expense of other sectors and other partners. Past 
experience generated only limited employment expansion, and models which permit 
unemployment provide somewhat more realistic results. More generally, it would appear that the 
predictions of existing modeling exercises have been largely irrelevant to the likely future 
Vietnamese trade experience after joining WTO. The reasons for this are embedded in the fact 
that tariff reform and associated price changes are of limited importance and the problems 
associated with low initial shares, under and unemployment, and foreign capital inflows. The 
same goes for market access improvements leading to demand driven outcomes, and the failure 
to capture endogenously the impacts of institutional changes and productivity improvements. 
 It is clear from our review of past studies that many authors are aware of the limitations 
of the basic methods applied, and yet difficulty in getting simulation results to conform to 
expectations as to trade reform impacts abound. The rhetoric of some studies evolves into more 
optimistic conclusions, but they actually involve a disconnection between the small numbers 
emerging from the models and the larger impacts experienced and anticipated in reality. A 
common strategy elsewhere has been to exogenously shift production functions outward. The 
claim that such shifts capture the link between trade and development highlights the inability of 
models (and existing theory) to represent endogenously the mechanisms by which trade may 
foster development and reduce poverty. There is conflicting evidence on poverty reduction as 
well – with some models showing trade liberalization leading to worsening poverty in Vietnam. 
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More importantly the impact of trade liberalization appears small relative to the effects of 
revenue replacement assumptions incorporated in modeling of alternative tax regimes (see 
Jensen and Tarp, 2005). In sum, most authors detail the important institutional changes underway 
in Vietnam by way of introduction, but refrain from incorporating them effectively into the 
subsequent analysis. 
 History following the implementation of past trade agreements, not model based results, 
would appear to justify the belief that WTO accession will lead to more rapid economic 
development and poverty alleviation. Vietnam’s experience, especially when the effects of past 
bilateral trade agreements are examined, shows the potential power of trade reform, broadly 
considered, in helping foster development. Our analysis of model revisions necessary to make 
tariff changes induce observed, detailed sector outcomes demonstrates that institutional changes 
beyond tariffs must lie behind the changes observed in the past in Vietnam. More simply, the fact 
that large new trade flows appear following bilateral agreements in sectors where tariffs were 
previously insignificant strongly suggests something else is going on.  
 Policy makers on the ground in Vietnam are already grappling with the importance of 
these institutional changes. Discussions of the prospects and challenges from Vietnam’s WTO 
accession invariably move towards discussion of services trade, legal reform, and the role of the 
state in the economy. But it is difficult to foresee quantitatively the impacts of reforms from 
those discussions. In the sector studies reviewed as background for this paper, authors tended to 
shy away from quantitative conclusions. Instead, recommendations for further institutional 
reforms are emphasized, while offering a simple indication of the anticipated direction of 
changes in competitive advantage. 
 The key puzzle for all those engaged in ongoing, policy relevant trade policy analysis 
(including academic researchers and development practitioners more broadly) is to identify the 
mechanisms through which trade influences development and so determine what limits the 
expansion of trade and growth, in particular sectors and overall. Vietnamese experience is clearly 
consistent with the trend toward developing dynamic versions of economy wide models (van der 
Mensbrugghe, 2005; and Ianchovichina et al., 2000). Dynamic development questions have to be 
captured in short to medium run models for them to be of interest in the above endeavor. Rapid 
growth and especially the limited employment generation of this experience highlight the 
limitations of analysis based on traditional clearing of factor markets, and under and 
 24
unemployment of labor are clearly significant in Vietnam. Demand constraints are also evident 
in the form of reemergence of textile quotas on Vietnam from the U.S. Finally, capital 
constraints are more puzzling, as Vietnam’s recent experience with foreign direct investment 
shows no consistent pattern related to economic performance.7 Accordingly, an important key to 
understanding the link between trade and development is to better understand the role of trade 
incentives on investment.  
Cross country studies of trade and growth highlight the need to uncover better the 
relationship between trade and productivity, as well (Hall and Jones, 1999; Andersen and 
Dalgaard, 2006). The results of this paper are also consistent with the recent poverty research at 
the World Bank (Hertel and Winters, 2005), which highlight market imperfections such as price 
transmission and employment to get the linkages between trade and poverty right.  
 Any path forward to quantitatively assessing the potential impacts of trade agreements in 
Vietnam and elsewhere will evidently need to respect the fundamental national accounting 
identities of the social accounting matrices (SAMs) that are the foundation of model based 
approaches to quantitative trade reform assessment. These incorporate the basic supply-demand 
balances and macroeconomic consistency that must hold. Development is a dynamic process, 
however, and we find that the key behavioral relationships which are in need of explanation are 
three-fold. They include (i) uncovering the factors that determine the evolution of the capital 
stock, hence capacity, by sector; (ii) establishing how productivity by sector evolves in response 
to trade incentives and institutional reforms; and (iii) determining how factors outside the 
country shape developments in market access (demand). Investment incentives from both price 
(tariff) changes and institutional changes – both foreign and domestic – may lead to new 
products, expanded capital accumulation, and higher productivity. These factors must be 
properly integrated for the analysis to be of relevance. 
 Vietnam is an important case illustrating successful economic development and poverty 
alleviation from a low income level. The extensive involvement of the state in the Vietnamese 
economy may make it a special case in some respects. Yet, the institutional reforms undertaken 
(particularly in preparation to join the WTO and as a consequence of past bilateral agreements) 
are commonly found in other developing countries, or are part of reform packages widely 
promoted by international organizations and in bilateral aid and policy negotiations. We believe 
the lessons from Vietnam have broad application in terms of the methodology employed to 
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examine trade liberalization as well as in assessing the linkages between international trade 
liberalization, development and poverty.  
 
NOTES 
 
1 See Thang (2004a, b). 
 
2 See for example Thanh (2005). 
 
3 Rama and Sa (2005) provide a useful overview of existing studies. See also Abbott et al. (2006) and references 
cited therein. 
 
4 It is a common practice in cross country growth regressions to utilize dummy variables dating trade regime 
changes (e.g. Sachs and Warner, 1995). Vietnam’s timeline shows the danger in trying to construct such a dummy 
variable in a meaningful way. 
 
5 See McCarty and Kalapesi (2003) for interesting background on this issue. 
 
6 1996 is the base year in both studies by Fukase and Martin (1999a, b), so we compare actual outcomes from that 
base year. ASEAN partnerships began in 1996, and U.S. trade started to expand in 1996 as well, but the real 
expansion came after the 2000 BTA was reached. 
 
7 This is consistent with the cross country regression literature on the relationship between FDI and growth, where a 
robust general relationship has not been found (Javorcik, 2004 and Keller, 2004) 
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Figure 1.  Economic Growth, Trade, FDI, and Poverty in Vietnam  
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1986 Doi Moi  (the Rennovation)  -- Economic reforms begin
1987
1988 Import tariffs introduced
1989 Market oriented reforms, Unified exchange rate
State monopoly of foreign trade  eliminated
1990 Export Processing zones established
1991 Law on Import and Export Duties  - established Preferential tariffs
1992 European Union trade agreement 
1993
1994 Quotas introduced
1995 WTO Accession Working Party  established
Joined ASEAN
1996
1997 Asian Financial Crisis begins
Reduced requirements on firms to enter foreign trade
1998 Joined APEC  (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation)
1999 MFN agreement with Japan
2000 US -Vietman Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA ) signed
2001 CEPT/AFTA  implementation plan under ASEAN begins
New Trade Policy Roadmap - most QRs removed
2002 ASEAN China  Free trade area
Implementation of US-BTA  begins
2003 ASEAN Japan  Comprehensive economic partnership
TRQs introduced
2004 EU -Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO Accession
Competition Law
2005 29 new or amended Laws on Commerce and Trade 
2006 Final bilateral agreements for WTO Accession reached
CEPT/AFTA under ASEAN implementation to be completed
Source: Adapted mostly from Thanh (2005) and www.WTO.org
Figure 2. Timeline for Vietnam's Trade Agreements and Economic Reforms - 1986 to 2006
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Figure 3. Vietnamese Exports to ASEAN countries Following Doi Moi (1986) and Joining 
ASEAN (1995), Million $US
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 Source: UN comtrade (2006) 
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Figure 4. Value of total Vietnamese Exports to Various Trading Partners
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 Source: UN comtrade (2006)
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  Food and Live Animals 4,384   Chemicals, Reltd.prod.nes 3,606
Fish, Crustaceans, Mullucs 2,196 Medicinal, Pharm.products 506
Cereals, Cereal preprtns. 767 Fertilizer except GRP272 630
Vegetables and Fruit 503 Plastics in primary form 829
Coffe, Tea, Cocoa, Spices 682
  Fuels, Lubricants etc. 4,151   Manufactured goods 6,641
Petroleum, Petrol. products 3,962 Leather, Leather goods 504
Textile yarn, Fabric etc. 2,441
Iron and Steel 1,896
  Misc manufactured articles 7,226   Machines, Transport Equipment 7,977
Furniture, Bedding etc. 644 Power generating machines 920
Clothing and Accessories 3,467 Special.indust.machinary 1,521
Footwear 2,299 Generel industl.mach.nes 953
Telecomm. sound equipment ect. 568
Elec. mch. appar, Parts.nes 1,284
Road vehicles 1,293
Other transport equipment 681
  Other Exports 4,388   Other Imports 7,032
  Total Exports 20,149   Total Imports 25,255
Leading Exports Leading Imports
Table 1. Key Vietnamese Imports and Exports in 2003, $U.S. million
Source: UN comtrade (2006) 
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  EU - 15 $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 45.0 60.8 1283.1 71.9 4546.5 65.3
      10 commodities 55.4 74.8 1504.1 84.3 5297.6 76.1
      15 commodities 61.7 83.3 1602.7 89.9 5791.5 83.2
      20 commodities 65.9 89.0 1660.3 93.1 6144.7 88.3
  Total 74.0 1783.7 6962.7
  No. of 3 Digit SITC Commodities 93 185 203
  US $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 306.2 89.6 671.8 75.9 5231.2 78.9
      10 commodities 328.8 96.2 820.5 92.7 5925.9 89.4
      15 commodities 333.6 97.6 849.9 96.0 6127.2 92.4
      20 commodities 336.5 98.5 860.2 97.2 6260.9 94.4
  Total 341.7 885.2 6630.1
  No. of 3 Digit SITC Commodities 88 108 138
  Singapore $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 100.7 77.9 660.0 80.6 1157.0 83.2
      10 commodities 116.7 90.2 699.8 85.5 1220.6 87.8
      15 commodities 121.0 93.6 726.3 88.7 1256.7 90.4
      20 commodities 123.5 95.5 748.0 91.3 1282.1 92.2
  Total 129.3 818.9 1390.5
  No. of 3 Digit SITC Commodities 104 182 184
  China $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 10.0 92.0 8.2 88.3 1946.8 78.4
      10 commodities 10.7 98.8 8.6 92.4 2147.8 86.5
      15 commodities 10.8 99.7 8.8 94.4 2230.4 89.9
      20 commodities 10.8 100.0 8.9 95.8 2287.3 92.2
  Total 10.8 9.3 2482.0
  No. of 3 Digit SITC Commodities 19 139 171
1992 2000 2004
1991 2000 2004
1996 2000 2004
Table 2. Vietnamese Exports to the EU, U.S., Singapore and China Around Bilateral Agreements
1990 1996 2004
 Source: UN comtrade (2006)
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Table 3. Predictions Based on 30 Scenarios of CGE Studies of the Impact of WTO Accession on Vietnam, 
Percentage Change 
Study       GDP      Export      Import 
 
Number 
of 
scenarios 
 
min 
 
max 
 
min 
 
max 
 
min 
 
max 
Fukase and 
Martin (1999b)a) 
5 -4.7 1.0 3.9 15.2 3.1 12.8 
CIE (2002)b) 7 0.2 3.3 0.6 12.1 N/A N/A 
Dee et al. (2005) 4 0.03 2.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Toan (2005)c) 1       fall       0.13       0.4 
Nguyen and Ezaki 
(2005) 
5 -0.06 -0.68 1.73 18.24 3.15 15.39 
Dimaranan et al. 
(2005)a) 
2 6.74 7.88 15.22 18.81 N/A N/A 
Huong and  
Vanzetti (2006) 
6 1 15 -2 57 -1 37 
Source: Authors’ review of cited references above and Abbott et al. (2006) 
Notes:  
a) These effects are reported in output, not GDP. Since only the sector-disaggregated predicted effects on output 
were reported in the paper, the numbers reported here are calculated averages of the predicted effects. 
b) The effects on GDP and exports were not calculated in scenarios (ii) and (iii). 
c) Since all predicted effects in the paper are only reported disaggregated into agriculture, service, and 
manufacturing, the numbers reported here are averages. The paper by Toan (2005) only has one scenario. 
d) Since all predicted effects are only reported as disaggregated into 22 sectors, the numbers reported here are 
calculated averages of these. 
 
 
 
Actual value Predicted changes
1996 1996-2000 1996-2004 2000-2004
$US million % % % %
  Indonesia 204.4 25 48.1 103.5 37.1
  Malaysia 150.4 59 202.9 285.7 27.3
  Philippines 196.9 226 -11.0 124.0 151.7
  Singapore 436.0 0.4 87.8 218.9 69.8
  Thailand 65.7 98 403.5 568.4 32.7
Source: Predictions are from Fukase and Martin (1999b)
Table 4. Model Predictions Versus Actuel Exports to ASEAN Partners after 1996
   Actual changes
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Actual value Predicted changes
1996 1996-2000 1996-2004 2000-2004
$US million % % % %
  Agriculture and Fores try 56.1 -1 575 1383 120
  Basic manufacturing 1.6 329 826 5596 515
  Beverages  and Tobacco 0.6 125 13 317 270
  Clothing 25.7 1512 106 10635 5113
  Coal, Oil, Gas 0.01 4 -49 1424 2888
  Chemical, Rubber, Plas tic 1.5 64 400 2140 348
  Electronics  & Machinery 0.4 284 737 29865 3478
  Others 5.1 N/A 180 594 148
  Processed Ag 119.5 19 28 44 13
  Petroleum & Coal 85.8 N/A 11 340 298
  Textiles 0.2 241 718 40804 4902
  Transport Equipment 0.02 N/A 559 63877 9613
  Light Manufacturing 45.1 147 263 2601 643
    Furniture &  Footwear 42.8 233 2182 584
     Rest of Light Manufact. 2.3 811 10255 1037
  Total 341.7 127.4 159 1576 547
Source:  Predictions  are taken from Fukase and Martin, W orld Bank, WPS2219, Nov 1999 
Table 5. Model Predictions Versus Actual Exports to the U.S. Following the BTA Implemented in 2002
   Actual changes
 
 
 
2000 2004 2000 2004
% % % %
  Cashews 11.5 30.4 0.9 0.0 -114
  Apparel and Clothing 0.1 3.8 38.7 15.4 -20
  Electronics 0.002 0.02 28.7 2.0 -11
  Fish, Crustaceans 3.0 5.1 0.5 0.3 -375
  Footware 1.0 2.9 26.3 10.6 -8
  Furniture 0.07 1.53 26.2 0.02 -13
  Coffee 4.6 5.5 0.008 0.005 -5468
  Imputed Armington 
Elasticity
Vietnam's Share of U.S. 
Market 
Table 6. Tariff Changes and Imputed Armington Elastiticies for Selected Commodities Following the U.S. BTA
  Tariff paid 
 Source: UN comtrade (2006) and author’s calculations. 
 
 
